Balancing Academic and Scientific Freedom

with National Security

 

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Scientific freedom
and national security

Organizations
of interest

Security affects on
foreign researchers

New rules about the transfer of select (dangerous) agents

Sensitive but unclassified
information

How security issues have affected federal grants and contracts

 

 

 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
(3 items)

U.S. Department of Defense considers tightening rules regarding foreign researchers

     The Department of Defense has proposed a series of rules regarding limiting access of foreign nationals to all DOD-funded research.  These changes are partly in response to rule changes proposed earlier this year by the Department of Commerce regarding "export-controlled information" (see below "DOC considers tightening rules regarding foreign researchers").  The proposed rules can be found in the Federal Register from 12 July.
     As proposed, the rules would require that all foreign nationals or persons working on any DOD-funded project wear badges that identify them as foreign and that they work in segregated work areas.  Universities would not be exempt from these rules.  The period for which comments may be submitted regarding these rule changes ends September 12, 2005.

    

Links on this topic:

Defense Rules Would Pinch Foreign-Born Scientists” – Yudhijit Bhattacharjee. Science 7/22/2005
 

After delay over security concerns, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America  (PNAS) publishes  article related to bioterrorism

     In one of the most high-profile cases regarding the publication of information that could potentially be used by terrorists, PNAS has decided to publish an article regarding the milk supply in the United States and how it could be targeted for poisoning by terrorists.  This article, from researchers at Stanford University, was published over the objections of some government agencies including the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 

 

Articles on this topic include:

Analyzing a bioterror attack on the food supply: The case of botulinum toxin in milk” – Lawrence M. Wein and Yifan Liu.  PNAS 6/28/2005
Modeling attacks on the food supply” – Bruce Alberts.  PNAS 6/28/2005 - this article is an editorial from Bruce Alberts, President of the National Academy of Sciences, explaining the rationale for publishing the article.
PNAS publishes bioterror paper, after all” – Alison McCook.  The Scientist 6/29/2005
"PNAS publishes botulinum paper" - Jocelyn Kaiser.  Science 7/1/2005


DOC considers tightening rules regarding foreign researchers

     The United States Department of Commerce is considering new rules that would require universities to more strictly control access to some controlled technologies, such as genetically modified microorganisms.  The proposed changes to Commerce's export administration regulations would impact on foreign nationals conducting research in universities or working with government sponsored research. 

     The rule changes are being proposed by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and are outlined in the Federal Register (3/28/2005, Volume 70, page 15607).  The proposed changes are in response to the recommendations contained in the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General Report entitled ``Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the U.S.'' (pdf file, Final Inspection Report No. IPE-16176-March 2004). 

 

More information can be found at http://bxa.fedworld.gov/whatsnew.cgi/exportreq.asc

 

Recent articles on this topic include:

Schools Fear Impact of Proposed License Changes” – Yudhijit Bhattacharjee. Science 5/13/2005

 

*****

 

The Debate on Scientific/Academic Freedom vs. National Security

 

To what degree are scientists “free” to pursue their research?  To what degree are they “free” to share their findings with others?  What about research in areas where the data would be dangerous to public safety if accessed by the wrong people? 

Clearly the needs of research to progress must be balanced with issues of security.  Exactly where that balance lies and who should hold authority over monitoring and enforcing regulations covering research is a matter of debate that has been brought to the forefront in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent terrorist attacks using anthrax-laced letters.

Adding urgency to the debate is the fact that information can be disseminated by just about anybody at a speed that was unheard of even fifteen years ago.  Whereas a recipe for a dangerous agent in the past could only be distributed in print, it can now be posted on a website for any person anywhere to read.  Furthermore, once posted on the internet, it is difficult if not impossible to trace who has accessed the information.

While the discussion used to focus primarily on security issues regarding weapons research performed in government labs, it has now expanded to cover research done in academic and industrial settings, where scientists previously could do research relatively unimpeded.  Several scientists in academic institutions have balked at recent attempts of the federal government to monitor and control the activities in their laboratories.  At Los Alamos National Laboratories, where employees already operated under strict security, repeated allegations of security breaches and subsequent crackdowns have alienated scientists to the degree that many are leaving or taking early retirement.

This webpage is intended to link the reader to resources that cover the various issues regarding academic freedom and national security.  As you will see below, there are many groups that have weighed in on this issue including virtually every organization whose membership is composed of researchers or academic institutions.

Reports, Documents, and Opinions About the Topic of National Security and Academic/Scientific Freedom

Academic Freedom and National Security in a Time of Crisis – A report from the Special Committee on Academic Freedom and National Security of the American Association of University Professors.

National Academies statement: Science and Security in an Age of Terrorism From Bruce Alberts, Wm. A. Wulf, and Harvey Fineberg, Presidents of the National Academies (October 18, 2002)

National Academies study: Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the "Dual Use" Dilemma.  A press release that contains information about the book released by the National Research Council on biotechnology and terrorisism (see below).

Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism – A publication of the National Research Council that recommends that the government expand existing regulations and rely on self-governance by scientists rather than adopt intrusive new policies (book for purchase from National Academies Press).

Position Statement on Avoiding High-Tech Terrorism – From the Foresight Insitute that deals with issues surrounding nanotechnology.  One of the few sites that addresses nanotech in particular.

The War on Terrorism: What Does it Mean for Science? – Shortly after the attacks of September 2001, the AAAS hosted a symposium on this issue.  A summary report and real audio links of the symposium are found on this website.  Now a bit outdated but this site provides a historical perspective as to what some scientists were thinking in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.

 

 

Organizations With Useful Information Regarding the Issue of Academic and Scientific Freedom vs. National Security

The following is a (far from complete) list of organizations that have useful links regarding the issue of academic/scientific freedom and national security.

American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has two separate webpages (see below) devoted to the topic of scientific freedom vs. national security.  They provide an excellent resource for anybody wishing to research this topic and were the source of many of the links on this site.

(AAAS) Science and National Security in the Post-9/11 Environment - This fairly up-to-date site contains links to several issues regarding the war on terrorism, national security, and how it affects researchers and their work.

(AAAS) Scientific Freedom vs. National Security - This site is a bit outdated but contains some important information including a report on a symposium held in December, 2001 entitled “The War on Terrorism: What Does it Mean for Science?”, a report on the handling of the Wen Ho Lee case and statements from the administration regarding science and security.

Association of American Universities – The AAU website contains a whole section dedicated to the issue of homeland security.

Center for Biosecurity - an independent, non-profit organization of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC). The Center works to prevent the development and use of biological weapons, to catalyze advances in science and governance that diminish the power of biological weapons as agents of mass lethality, and to lessen the illness, death and civil disruption that would result if prevention efforts fail.  The Center draws upon the expertise of a multidisciplinary professional staff with experience in the government, medicine, public health and bioscience.

Taking the Measure of Countermeasures: Leaders' Views on the Nation's Capacity to Develop Biodefense Countermeasures (10/12/04)

Center for Strategic and International Studies/National Academies Collaboration on Scientific Communication and National Security – A site that stemmed from a collaboration between the Center for Stratigic and International Studies (CSIS) and the National Acadamies (NA) to address to undertake an evaluation of the relationship between scientific communication and national security in the post-September 11th threat environment.

Council On Government Relations (COGR)an association of research universities with a primary function to provide advice and information to its membership and to make certain that federal agencies understand academic operations and the impact of proposed regulations on colleges and universities.  COGR helps to develop policies and practices that fairly reflect the mutual interests and separate obligations of federal agencies and universities in research and graduate education.

Federation of American ScientistsContains several pages devoted to national security and how it affects research, particularly in the realm of nuclear proliferation.  The Federation of American Scientists is a nonprofit organization founded in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists. The founders were members of the Manhattan Project, creators of the atom bomb. FAS is dedicated to ending the worldwide arms race and avoiding the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose.

The Foresight InstituteThe Foresight institute deals with issues, including policy issues, surrounding nanotechnology.  Foresight Institute's goal is to guide emerging technologies to improve the human condition. Foresight focuses its efforts upon nanotechnology, the coming ability to build products—of any size—with atomic precision.

The National AcademiesThe National Academies bring together committees of experts in all areas of scientific and technological endeavor. These experts serve pro bono to address critical national issues and give advice to the federal government and the public.  Four organizations comprise the Academies: the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council.

The National Academies have a extensive section of their website devoted to the topic of national security.

The National Academic Consortium for Homeland Securitycomprised of public and private academic institutions engaged in scientific research, technology development and transition, education and training, and service programs concerned with current and future U.S. national security challenges, issues, problems and solutions.

The Sunshine Project - an international non-profit organization with offices in Hamburg, Germany and Austin, Texas, USA.  Works against the hostile use of biotechnology in the post-Cold War era.  Researches and publishes to strengthen the global consensus against biological warfare and to ensure that international treaties effectively prevent development and use of biological weapons.

 

How heightened security affects foreign researchers/students

Researchers from other countries are the most adversely affected by the hightened state of security.  These scientists face increased scrutiny in obtaining visas and are sometimes barred from working on projects previously available to them.  Many US citizen researchers are equally aggravated by the difficulties they encounter in hiring and collaborating with foreign nationals.  These regulations are particularly intrusive to laboratories where many of the researchers come from other countries.

Foreign Students and Scholars – A very well put together summary of the issue of foreign scientists and national security on the AAAS website by Allison Chamberlain with many useful links.  Highly recommended as a place to start on this topic.  Many of the links below were found on this site.

Reports, Documents, and Opinions on the Subject of Foreign Researchers and National Security

Statement and Recommendations on Visa Problems Harming America's Scientific, Economic, and Security Interests – A pdf (Adobe Acrobat) file containing a joint statement released by several scientific, engineering, and academic organizations.  Released on May 12, 2004, this document provides a fairly comprehensive review of the subject and proposes recommendations for how to correct the problems that are plaguing our visa system.  A great start if you want to know more about the issue.

Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the U.S. (pdf file) – A report from the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General that concludes that current regulations may not prevent foreign nationals from “countries and entities of concern” from accessing controlled information and technology.  The recommendations contained within the report may directly affect foreign-born researchers, especially those from countries like China and the nations of the Islamic world like Iran and Iraq.  The version linked here is the Final Inspection Report (No. IPE-16176-March 2004). 

America Closes the Door to Scientific Progress – An essay by Alan Lesher that appeared in the Financial Times on May 30, 2003.

Fear of "Foreigners" May Slow Scientific Progress – An article from AAAS.

Remarks from John Marburger III regarding scientific communication and national security – From the roundtable on Scientific Communication and National Security held by the National Academy of Science on June 19, 2003.  John Marburger III, the Director of the Administration’s Office on Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), comments on grant contracts, student visas and publishing sensitive information in the age of terrorism (pdf file).

Comments from John Marburger III regarding student visas – From the AAAS Colloquium on S&T Policy.

American Institute of Physics report - Physics Students from Abroad in the Post-9/11 Era (6/03)

Other Information and Resources Regarding Foreign Nationals

The American Society of Microbiology visa information page - Information regarding policies, laws and regulations announced by U.S. government sources related to international student or scholar visas.

National Academies International Visitors Office

American Physical Society visa information page - Information regarding policies, laws and regulations announced by U.S. government sources related to international student or scholar visas.

NAFSA: Association of International Educators – A link to their immigration advising resources.

 

New rules about the transfer of select (dangerous) agents

In response to the anthrax mail attacks in 2001, the US government created a series of regulations to regulate the possession of biological agents and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety.  These regulations are contained in the the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) now maintains a list of over 80 biological agents that are considered to be highly dangerous to public health.  Government agencies, universities, research institutions, and commercial entities that possess, use or transfer biologic agents and toxins that pose a significant threat to public health Institutions working with these agents must now register with the CDC’s “Select Agent Program”, and adhere to strict safety and security regulations.  These security regulations include extensive background checks on persons wishing to handle these agents.  Final rules about the possession, use and transfer of select agents were published in March 2005 by the Department of Health and Human Services (parent department of the CDC) and the USDA (see below).

The new rules are costly to institutions choosing to work on these agents.  Not only are there additional costs to increase security and monitor compliance, but facilities choosing to work on these agents expose themselves to tremendous legal risk should their employees fail to follow these rules.  For these reasons many laboratories, including researchers at Stanford University, are choosing to not work on these agents. 

The legal risks institutions face with working on these agents are serious.  In the most famous case so far, Thomas Butler, a researcher at Texas Tech University, was charged with several counts of illegally transporting select agents, mishandling select agents, and subsequently lying to FBI agents about his actions.

Select Agent Rules – A very well put together summary of the issue of select agents on the AAAS website by Allison Chamberlain with many useful links.  Highly recommended as a place to start on this topic.  Many of the links below were found on this site.

Reports, Documents, and Opinions About the Rules on Select Agents

*"Biosecurity and Research: Minimizing Adverse Impacts" By Jennifer Gaudioso and Reynolds M. Salerno. Science. Vol. 304. 30 April 2004. – An excellent article regarding the adverse impacts of the regulations.

Information and Resources on Select Agents

CDC Select Agents Program - Information regarding the Select Agents Program including application information, current regulations and additional resources.

HHS Final Rule on Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, Federal Register, March 18, 2005.

USDA Final Rule on Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins, Federal Register, March 18, 2005.

 

The new category of “sensitive but unclassified” (SBU) information

Before September 11th, the line between classified and unclassified information was relatively clear.  The National Security Decision Directive 189 (NSDD-189) stated that there would be "no restrictions…upon the conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification."  This directive, issued during the Regan Administration, basically allowed the free use of any information that was not specifically deemed “classified” by the government. 

In response to the terror attacks in 2001, the Bush Administration issued a memorandum to government agencies on safeguarding "sensitive but unclassified" (SBU) information, also known as "Sensitive Homeland Security Information.  The memo directed recipients to “undertake an immediate reexamination of current measures for identifying and safeguarding” Government information in their respective department or agency “regarding weapons of mass destruction, as well as other information that could be misused to harm the security of our nation and the safety of our people.”  The SBU category was included in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  This directive has already been used to block public access to a variety of documents relating to chemical and biological warfare.

Some have accused the administration of being too vague in the definition of SBU and of applying it recklessly and ineffectively to suppress information that has either no value to terrorists or that terrorists could easily obtain elsewhere.  The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has noted that “The establishment of such a category as "sensitive but unclassified" information has significant implications for scientific research and communication because of potential restrictions on information exchange between scientists, the government, and the public.”

 “Sensitive but Unclassified Information – A very well put together commentary about SBU information on the AAAS website by Ryan Ricks with excellent links to the subject of “sensitive but unclassified” information.  Highly recommended as a place to start on this topic.  Many of the links below were found on this site.

SBU Resource Center on OpenTheGovernment.org – Another site that contains links to several resources regarding SBU.  If you can’t tell by the name, this site is a tad partisan but it has several useful links that the AAAS site does not.

SBU info on "OMB Watch" site – A fairly thorough, yet somewhat partisan, site with several links and a useful description of the SBU controversy.  OMB Watch is a watchdog organization interested in removing secrecy from the government.

Reports, Documents, and Opinions Regarding SBU

National Security Decision Directive 189: National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information (9/21/85) – On the Federation of American Scientists website.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002

Definitions and Regulations Involved in the Classified-Sensitive Information-Unclassified Debate a large table that defines all the terms regarding sensitive but unclassified information.  Compiled by the Association of American Universities (3/3/03; PDF)

Letter from higher education community on scientific openness – A letter regarding scientific openness from the presidents of the Association of American Universities (AAU), the Council on Governmental Relations (COGR) and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) to John Marburger, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (1/31/03)

Remarks from John Marburger III regarding scientific communication and national security – From the roundtable on Scientific Communication and National Security held by the National Academy of Science on June 19, 2003.  John Marburger III, the Director of the Administration’s Office on Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), comments on grant contracts, student visas and publishing sensitive information in the age of terrorism (pdf file).

The following three government reports are rather large PDF files (read with Adobe Acrobat) but offer a detailed analysis of the controversies surrounding SBU and a related category SSI (sensitive security information).

Congressional Research Service report RL31845 – "Sensitive But Unclassified" and Other Federal Security Controls on Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current Controversy (4/2/03; PDF format)

Congressional Research Service Report RL32425 – Sensitive Security Information and Transportation Security: Issues and Congressional Options (6/14/04; PDF)

The Library of Congress Federal Research Division report – "Laws and Regulations Governing the Protection of Sensitive But Unclassified Information" (9/04; PDF)

How security issues have affected federal grants and contracts

Since 9/11 there has been a significant change in the regulations regarding how contracts are awarded.  Clauses have been added to some grants that require background checks of foreign researchers or that give the government the ability to review the research before it is sent out for publication.  Many Universities have successfully renegotiated some of the terms of these grant contracts to lessen the effects of these rules.  However, in case regarding military funding of basic research, several computer scientists at UCLA opted out of receiving funding since one stipulation was that no foreign researchers be allowed to work in the laboratory.  This topic overlaps significantly with the topic of security and how it affects foreign researchers, and the topic of “sensitive but unclassified” information.

 “Federal Grants and Contracts – A very well put together commentary about SBU information on the AAAS website written by Allison Chamberlain with excellent links to many reports and opinions on this issue.  Highly recommended as a place to start on this topic.  Many of the links below were found on this site.

Reports, Documents, and Opinions Regarding Federal Grants and Contracts

Pentagon Redirects its Research Dollars” – An article covering how the Pentagon is diverting funds away from academic institutions and basic research in part due to secrecy and security issues.  By John Markoff, New York Times, April 2, 2005

Remarks from John Marburger III regarding scientific communication and national security – From the roundtable on Scientific Communication and National Security held by the National Academy of Science on June 19, 2003.  John Marburger III, the Director of the Administration’s Office on Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), comments on grant contracts, student visas and publishing sensitive information in the age of terrorism (pdf file).

MIT/COGR list of troublesome clauses in government research award contracts – A summary of the troublesome clauses that appear in research award contracts, particularly from awards originating from the Department of Defense.  This list was compiled by MIT and COGR.  A Microsoft word document.  Also includes a related background memo.  

AAU/COGR Task Force report “Restrictions on Research Awards: Troublesome Clauses” – The report from the Joint AAU/COGR Task Force on Restrictions on Research Awards and Troublesome Research Clauses.  Appears as enclosure along with a letter to John Marburger III, the Director of the Office on Science and Techology Policy (OSTP).

 

 

This page created and maintained by William Navarre, Ph.D.,

FOSEP member and

Senior Postdoctoral Fellow in the Departments of Laboratory

Medicine and Microbiology at the University of Washington

 

 

News on National Security and Academic/Scientific Freedom


 

"Defense Rules Would Pinch Foreign-Born Scientists" - by Yudhijit Bhattacharjee.  Science 7/22/05
"New Panel to Offer Guidance on Dual-Use Science" by Jocelyn Kaiser, Science 7/8/2005
"Security Issues Threaten Science Field" Sci-Tech Today 6/22/2005
“Détente Declared on NIH Biodefense Funding” by Jocelyn Kaiser, Science 5/13/2005
Education Department weighing national student database” – by David Goldstein, Kansas City Star, 4/12/05

Pentagon Redirects its Research Dollars” - An article covering how the Pentagon is diverting funds away from academic institutions and basic research, in part due to secrecy and security issues.  by John Markoff, -  New York Times, 4/2/2005 (registration may be required)

"Ethics: A Weapon to Counter Bioterrorism"- by Margaret A. Somerville and Ronald M. Atlas. Science 3/25/05
"Report Faults Smallpox Vaccination" - by Jocelyn Kaiser.  Science 3/11/05

"Unnoticed Amendment Bans Synthesis of Smallpox Virus" - by Martin Enserink. Science 3/11/05

"Has Biodefense Gone Overboard?" - by Martin Enserink and Jocelyn Kaiser. Science 3/4/05

"Microbiologist on a Mission" - by Jocelyn Kaiser.  Science 3/4/05

 


Select Agents

"Researchers Relieved by Final Biosecurity Rules" - by Jocelyn Kaiser - Science 4/1/05

 


Foreign Researchers

"Defense Rules Would Pinch Foreign-Born Scientists" - by Yudhijit Bhattacharjee.  Science 7/22/05
"Security Issues Threaten Science Field"
Sci-Tech Today 6/22/2005

U.S. Sponsors More Students - by Syeda Sultana Rizvi. The Daily Targum 4/21/05

"New Rules Ease Scientific Exchanges" - by Yudhijit Bhattacharjee. Science 2/18/05

 


The Crisis at Los Alamos National Laboratories

"A Bidding War for Los Alamos" - by Eli Kintisch. Science 5/27/05

"Los Alamos Appoints Interim Director" - by Eli Kintisch. Science 5/11/05

"Battelle Bows Out of Race to Run Los Alamos Lab" - by Eli Kintisch. Science 3/11/05

 

 


Issues Regarding Sensitive Research at Academic Institutions

The Pathology of Government-Funded Research - The University's Biocontainment Lab: Coming to a Neighborhood Near You! – by Zbignew Zingh, Dissident Voice 4/14/05

UW defends proposal to build biomedical research lab in city.  But neighbors say they fear escape of deadly agents – by Jake Ellison, Seattle Post-Intelligencer 4/12/05

"Biosafety Lab Fallout in Boston" - by Andrew Lawler. Science 2/11/05

"Boston University Under Fire for Pathogen Mishap" by Andrew Lawler – Science 1/28/05

UW defends proposal to build biomedical research lab in city.  But neighbors say they fear escape of deadly agents